[EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE]

VAN DUYN v. HOME OFFICE

[Case 41/74]

European Economic Community - Free movement of workers - Public policy - Organisation contrary to public good - Lawful for United Kingdom nationals to work in organisation - Whether other community workers free to enter United Kingdom and work for organisation - Scientology - Difference between regulation and directive - E.E.C. Treaty (Cmnd. 5179-II), arts. 48, 177, 189 - Directive 64/221/EEC, art. 3 (1)

By article 48 of the E.E.C.Treaty:

"1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the community... 2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the member states, as regards employment,... 3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public safety or security...; (a) to accept offers of employment actually made,... (c) to stay in a member state for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that state laid down by law,..."

By article 3 (1) of the Directive 64/221/EEC of February 25, 1964:

"Measures taken on grounds of public policy or of public security shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned."

The plaintiff, a Dutch national, was refused leave to enter the United Kingdom because she intended to work at a scientology establishment in Sussex. Although the practice of scientology was lawful in the United Kingdom, the government considered that its activities were contrary to public policy and aliens, who intended to work at a scientology establishment, were not admitted into the country. The plaintiff brought an action against the Home Office for declarations that she was entitled under article 48 of the Treaty to enter and remain in the United Kingdom for the purpose of her intended employment.
On a reference by the High Court to the European Court of Justice of the questions (1) whether article 48 of the Treaty and (2) Directive 64/221, were directly applicable so as to confer on individuals rights enforceable by them in the courts of a member state; and (3) whether, upon the proper interpretation of article 48 of the Treaty and article 3 of the Directive, a member state in the performance of its duty to base a measure taken on the grounds of public policy exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned was entitled to take into account as matters of personal conduct (a) the fact that the individual was or had been associated with some body or organisation the activities of which the member state considered contrary to the public good but which were not unlawful in that state, (b) the fact that the individual intended to take employment in the member state with such a body or organisation when no restriction was placed on the nationals of the member state who wished to take similar employment with such a body or organisation: -
Held, (1) that article 48 of the Treaty was directly applicable so as to confer on individuals rights enforceable by them in the courts of a member state; the provisions of article 48 (1) and (2) imposed a precise obligation which did not require the adoption of any further measure on the part either of the community institutions or of the member states and which left them, in relation to its implemention, no discretionary power (post, pp. 376B-D, 379E-F).
(2) That, although by article 189 ¹ a directive, unlike a regulation, did not necessarily take direct action in each member state, since in the present case article 3 (1) of the Directive was intended to limit the discretionary power which national laws generally conferred on the authorities responsible for the entry and expulsion of foreign nationals, and individuals should be able to rely on that obligation even though it had been laid down in a legislative act which had no automatic direct effect in its entirety, article 3 (1) of the Directive conferred on individuals rights which were enforceable by them in the courts of a member state and which the national courts must protect (post, pp. 376G - 377B, 379F).
(3) That, although a person's past association with a body or organisation could not, in general, justify a decision refusing him the right to move freely within the community on the ground that such association constituted personal conduct within the meaning of article 3 of Directive 64/221, present association, which reflected participation in the activities of the body or organisation, might be considered a voluntary act of the person concerned and, consequently, as part of his personal conduct within the meaning of article 3 (post, p. 378A-B); that, where the competent authorities of a member state had clearly defined their standpoint, considering particular activities to be socially harmful, and had taken administrative measures to counteract those activities, the member state could not be required, before it could rely on the concept of public policy, to make such activities unlawful (post, p. 378E); further, that it was a principle of international law, which the Treaty could not be assumed to disregard, that a state was precluded from refusing its own nationals entry (post, pp. 378H - 379A); that a member state, for reasons of public policy, could refuse the benefit of the principle of freedom of movement for workers where a national of another member state proposed to take up a particular offer of employment, even though the member state did not place a similar restriction on its own nationals; and that, accordingly, the reply to the third question must be that article 48 of the Treaty and article 3 (1) of the Directive were to be interpreted as meaning that a member state, in imposing restrictions justified on grounds of public policy, was entitled to take into account, as a matter of personal conduct of the individual concerned, the fact that the individual was associated with some body or organisation the activities of which the member state considered socially harmful
but which were not unlawful in that state, although no restriction was placed upon nationals of that state who wished to take similar employments with those same bodies or organisations (post, p. 379B, C, G-H).

The following cases are referred to in the judgment:

Corvelyn (Belgian Conseil d'Etat), October 7, 1968; [1968] Bull.Arr. 710.
French Merchant Seamen, In re; E.C. Commission v. France (Case 167/73) [1974] E.C.R. 359; [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 216.
Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein (Case 9/70) (1970) XVI (2) Recueil 825; [1971] C.M.L.R. 1.
Lütticke (Alfons) G.m.b.H. v. Hauptzollamt Sarrelouis (Case 57/65) (1966) XII Recueil 293; [1971] C.M.L.R. 674.
Reyners v. Belgian State (Case 2/74) [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 305.
Salgoil S.p.A. v. Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade (Case 13/68) (1968) XIV Recueil 661; [1969] C.M.L.R. 181.
S.A.C.E. v. Italian Ministry of Finance (Case 33/70) (1970) XVI (2) Recueil 1213; [1971] C.M.L.R. 123.

The following additional cases were cited in the opinion of Mr. Advocate-General (Henri Mayras):

Haselhorst v. Finanzamt Düsseldorf-Altstadt (Case 23/70) (1970) XVI (2) Recueil 881; [1971] C.M.L.R. 1.
Transports Lesage et Cie v. Hauptzollamt Freiburg (Case 20/70) (1970) XVI (2) Recueil 861; [1971] C.M.L.R. 1.
Württembergische Milchverwertung-Süd-milch A.G. v. Ugliola (Case 15/69) (1969) XV Recueil 363; [1970] C.M.L.R. 194.

REFERENCE by High Court of Justice
The plaintiff, Yvonne Van Duyn, a Dutch national, brought an action against the Home Office in the Chancery Division of the High Court for declarations that she was entitled to accept an offer of employment as a secretary by the Church of Scientology in East Grinstead, Sussex, and that she was entitled to enter and stay in the United Kingdom for the purpose of employment. On March 1, 1974, Pennycuick V.-C., pursuant to article 177 of the E.E.C. Treaty, ordered a reference to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling in the action on the interpretation of article 48 of the Treaty and article 3 of Directive 64/221/EEC concerning the movement of nationals of member states within the community: see [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1107.
The order of the High Court was registered at the European Court of Justice on June 13, 1974.
The facts are stated in the judgment of the court.

Alan Newman for Miss Van Duyn.
Peter Gibson for the United Kingdom.
Anthony McClellan for the Commission.

OPINION of Mr. Advocate-General Henri Mayras.
Introduction. This preliminary reference is of special interest for two reasons. It is the first time that a court of the United Kingdom, the High Court of Justice in London, has made a reference to the Court of Justice for interpretation of community rules under article 177 of the Treaty of Rome. This is also the first time that the court has been called upon to decide the important problem raised by the limitations, expressed in article 48 of the Treaty, to the principle of freedom of movement for workers within the community imposed by considerations of public policy and public security.
Consequently, the court will have to examine, in this connection, the extent to which the power of the member states to assess the essential requirements of national public policy can be reconciled with a uniform application of community law and in particular with the application of the principle of non-discrimination between migrant and national workers.
The court will also have to make a ruling as to the direct effect of a directive of the Council, or at least of a particular provision of a directive. The case law of this court does however already indicate the reply to be given to this question.
I. The facts. The facts giving rise to the main action are straightforward. Miss Yvonne Van Duyn, a Dutch national, arrived at Gatwick Airport in England on May 9, 1973. She declared that her purpose in coming to the United Kingdom was to take up an offer of employment as a secretary, made to her a few days earlier by the Church of Scientology of California, the headquarters of which are at Saint Hill Manor, East Grinstead, in the County of Sussex. After an interview with the immigration authorities, she was returned to the Netherlands that same day.
The ground of refusal of leave to enter the United Kingdom is stated in the document handed to her by the immigration officer. It reads:

"You have asked for leave to enter the United Kingdom in order to take employment with the Church of Scientology but the Secretary of State considers it undesirable to give anyone leave to enter the United Kingdom on the business of or in the employment of that organisation."

This decision was taken in accordance with the policy adopted, in 1968, by the Government of the United Kingdom which considered - and still considers - the activities of the Church of Scientology to be socially harmful.
The grounds of the decision to exclude Miss Van Duyn must be re-examined when one comes to consider the question of whether the decision taken by the immigration authorities is based on the "personal conduct" of the plaintiff, within the meaning of article 3 (1) of Council Directive 64/221.
In her action in the High Court (Chancery Division) against the Home Office, Miss Van Duyn sought to rely on article 48 of the Treaty and on article 3 of Directive 64/221, adopted for the purpose of co-ordinating special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. After examining the motion made by the plaintiff in the main action and upon hearing counsel for the Home Office, Pennycuick V.-C. decided to stay the proceedings and to refer three preliminary questions to the court.
The first question concerns the direct effect of article 48 of the Treaty. Under the second, the court is asked whether Council Directive 64/221 is also directly applicable so as to confer on individuals rights enforceable by them in the courts of the member states. The third question concerns the interpretation of article 48 of the Treaty and of article 3 of the Directive. The High Court asks whether, when the competent authorities of a member state decide, on grounds of public policy, to refuse a community national leave to enter that state on the basis of the personal conduct of the individual concerned, those authorities are entitled to take into account, as being matters of personal conduct: (a) the fact that the individual is or has been associated with an organisation the activities of which the government of the member state considers to be contrary to the public good but which are not unlawful in that state; (b) the fact that the individual intends to take up employment in a member state with such an organisation, it being the case however that no restrictions are placed upon nationals of the member state who take up similar employment. These three questions are clearly framed and follow a logical order.
II. Discussion. (1) Direct effect of article 48 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. The criteria which the court has evolved over the past years for the purpose of determining whether a provision of community law and, in particular, a rule set out in the Treaty of Rome, is directly applicable so as to confer on individuals rights enforceable by them in the national courts, are clearly laid down: the provision must impose a clear and precise obligation on member states; it must be unconditional, in other words subject to no limitation; if, however, a provision is subject to certain limitations, their nature and extent must be exactly defined; finally, the implementation of a community rule must not be subject to the adoption of any subsequent rules or regulations on the part either of the community institutions or of the member states, so that, in particular, member states must not be left any real discretion with regard to the application of the rule in question.
These criteria, which Mr. Advocate-General Gand proposed in 1966 in his opinion in Alfons Lütticke G.m.b.H. v. Hauptzollamt Sarrelouis (Case 57/65) (1966) XII Recueil 293, 311, and which the court has adopted in several judgments, have been confirmed and refined in particular by the judgments of September 12, 1972, International Fruit Co. N.V. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit (Cases 21 to 24/72) XVIII Recueil 1219, 1227, and October 24, 1973, Schlüter v. Hauptzollamt Lörrach (Case 9/73) [1973] E.C.R. 1135 and, more recently still, by the judgment of June 21, 1974, Reyners v. Belgian State (Case 2/74) [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 305 in connection with article 53, on the right of establishment.
The fact that the provisions of article 48, which are among the most important in the Treaty in that their purpose is to establish freedom of movement within the community for employed persons, satisfy these criteria can no longer be open to doubt following the Judgment, also very recent, of April 4, 1974, In re French Merchant Seamen; E.C. Commission v. France (Case 167/73) [1974] E.C.R. 359. By that decision, the court stated that the provisions of article 48 and of Regulation 1612/68 of the Council on employment of migrant workers are directly applicable in the legal system of every member state and give rise, on the part of those concerned, to rights which the national authorities must respect and safeguard.
If the High Court of England had had knowledge of that judgment when it decided to make this reference for a preliminary ruling, it is probable that it would not have put its first question to the court. It is understandable that it considered it necessary to do so because it made its order for reference on March 1, in other words before the court delivered its decision on the direct effect of article 48. The problem is now resolved for the future and it suffices for the court to confirm, with regard to this matter, its judgment of April 4, 1974.
(2) Direct effect of Council Directive 64/221. There is less certainty regarding the solution of the second question which is concerned with the direct applicability of the Council Directive of February 25, 1964.
Article 189 of the Treaty distinguishes between regulations, which are not only binding but also directly applicable in the member states, and directives, which are also binding on the states but which have, in principle, no direct effect inasmuch as they leave to the states the choice of methods for their implementation. Nevertheless, looking beyond formal legal categories, the court declared in its judgments of October 6 and 21, 1970, Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein (Case 9/70) (1970) XVI (2) Recueil 825, 838; Transports Lesage et Cie v. Hauptzollamt Freiburg (Case 20/70) (1970) XVI (2) Recueil 861, 874; Haselhorst v. Finanzamt DÖsseldorf-Altstadt (Case 23/70) (1970) XVI (2) Recueil 881, that, apart from regulations, other community acts mentioned in article 189 may have direct effect, particularly in cases where the community authorities have imposed on member states the obligation to adopt a particular course of conduct.
The statement contained in the judgment of December 17, 1970, S.A.C.E. v. Italian Ministry of Finance (Case 33/70) (1970) XVI (2) Recueil 1213, 1224, is even clearer:

"a directive, the purpose of which is to set a final date for the implementation by a member state of a community obligation, concerns not only the relations between the commission and that state, but also entails legal consequences on which individuals may in particular rely whenever, by its very nature, the provision enacting that obligation is directly applicable."

When faced with a directive, it is therefore necessary to examine, in each case, whether the wording, nature and general scheme of the provisions in question are capable of producing direct effects between the member states to which the directive is addressed and their subjects.
The purpose of Council Directive 64/221 is to co-ordinate, in the member states, measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health. It was adopted on the basis of article 48 - and it in fact refers expressly to the rules applicable at that time to freedom of movement for workers - and of article 56, on the right of establishment. The Directive is intended to limit the powers which the states have undeniably retained to ensure, within the area of their competence, the safeguarding of their public policy and, in particular, of public security within their territory. Article 3 (1) of the Directive lays down: "measures taken on ground of public policy or public security shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the person concerned." For the purpose of giving a practical answer to the question put by the High Court there is in fact no need to examine whether all the rules fixed by the Directive have direct effect or not. Only article 3 (1) is relevant in this case. However, in order to judge whether article 3 (1) is directly applicable, it is necessary to approach the matter of its interpretation and therefore to encroach a little on the third preliminary question.
As to the scope of article 3 (1), there is no doubt that it covers both employed persons, dealt with under article 48, and those pursuing activities as self-employed persons, dealt with under articles 52 et seq. With regard to employed migrants, the Council had the power under article 48 to adopt a regulation, and this is what it did as regards the conditions of their employment in a member state. For persons who are self-employed, article 56 (2) limits the possibility to the use of directives. Without doubt the Commission considered it desirable to unify, by means of the same legal instrument, the rules concerning freedom of movement for the employed and those concerning the right of establishment of the self-employed, at least as regards measures relating to public policy in the member states. But recourse to that procedure does not preclude article 3 of the Directive from having direct effect. What other aim could the Council have had in enacting this provision than to limit the discretionary power of member states and subject restrictions on freedom of movement, such as refusal of leave to enter, exclusion or expulsion, to the condition that these measures should be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the persons concerned? It seems that the Council thereby wished to prevent member states from taking general measures relating to whole categories of persons and, were seeking, in particular, to prohibit collective exclusions and expulsions.
The Council has, in any case, imposed on member states a clear and precise obligation. The first condition for direct effect is satisfied. The second is also. The rule is sufficient in itself. It is not subject either to the adoption of subsequent acts on the part either of the community authorities or of member states. The fact that the latter have, in accordance with the principle relating to directives, the choice of form and methods which accord with their national law does not imply that the community rule is not directly applicable. On the contrary, it is so closely linked to the implementation of article 48, as regards employed persons, that it seems to be inseparable from and is of the same nature as that provision of the Treaty.
Finally, it is clear that even though the states have retained their competence in the field of public security, article 3 (1) of the Directive imposes a specific limitation on that competence, in the exercise of which they cannot act in a discretionary manner towards community nationals.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the provision in question confers on community nationals rights which are enforceable by them in the national courts and which the latter must protect.
(3) Public security and the concept of personal conduct. What is meant by "personal conduct" which is such as to justify refusal of leave to enter a member state? How should this concept be defined? Looking beyond a commentary on the words themselves, the solution seems to be governed by two prime considerations.
First, freedom of movement for workers is one of the fundamental principles of the Treaty and the prohibition on any discrimination on grounds of nationality between workers of the member states is not subject to any other limitations than those provided for, in restrictive terms, in article 48 (3), relating to public policy, public security and public health: judgment of October 15, 1969, Württembergische Milchverwertung-Süd-milch A.G. v. Ugliola (Case 15/69) (1969) XV Recueil 363, 368. Secondly, if a "community public policy" exists in areas where the Treaty has the aim or the effect of transferring directly to community institutions powers previously exercised by member states, it can only be an economic public policy relating for example to community organisations of the agricultural market, to trade, to the common customs tariff or to the rules on competition.
On the other hand, it seems that, under present conditions and given the present position of the law, member states have sole power, given the exceptions expressed in certain community provisions such as Directive 64/221 to take measures for the safeguarding of public security within their territory and to decide the circumstances under which that security may be endangered. In other words, even though the general proviso relating to public policy, which is found both in article 48 and in article 56, is a limited exception to the principles of the Treaty concerning freedom of movement and freedom of establishment, and one which must be restrictively construed, it does not seem, contrary to the opinion of the Commission, that it is possible to deduce a community concept of public security. This concept remains, at least for the present, national, and this conforms with reality inasmuch as the requirements of public security vary, in time and in space, from one state to another.
The third question must, it would seem, be decided in accordance with the above considerations.
First of all, to what extent can the concept "personal conduct" be applied to the facts provided by the national court, namely, that a community national is associated with an organisation the activities of which are considered to be contrary to public policy, without however being illegal, and that she intends to take up employment with that organisation, it being the case that nationals are not subject, in similar circumstances, to any restriction?
The question, expressed in those terms, led to the examination of the file received from the High Court for evidence permitting a clearer understanding of the facts which warranted the exclusion of the plaintiff in the main action.
It is clear from the file that not only did the plaintiff go to England with the avowed intention of taking up employment as a secretary with the Church of Scientology, but that she had already worked in a scientology establishment in the Netherlands for six months prior to her arrival in England and that she had taken a course in scientology and was a practising scientologist. It is clearly on the basis of these facts as a whole, the accuracy of which it is obviously not for the court to judge, that the British immigration authorities decided to refuse her leave to enter. It also emerges from the file that in 1968 the United Kingdom Minister of Health made a statement in Parliament in which he expressed the opinion that: "Scientology is a pseudo-philosophical cult" of which the principles and practice are, in the opinion of the British Government, a danger both to public security and to the health of those who submit to it. The Minister announced, on that occasion, the decision of the government to take all steps within its powers to curb the activity of the organisation. He stated that although there was no power under national law to prohibit the practice of scientology, the government could at least refuse entry to foreign nationals intending to work at the headquarters of the Church of Scientology in England.
It is, it seems, on the basis of this policy that Miss Van Duyn was refused leave to enter the United Kingdom by reason as much of the links which she had already had in the past with the said "Church" in the Netherlands as of the fact that she was herself a practising scientologist and, finally, by reason of her intention to take up employment at Saint Hill Manor.
Given this information, there is no doubt that these facts fall within the concept of "personal conduct" within the meaning of article 3 (1) of the Directive and that mere association, albeit only through a contract of employment, with the Church of Scientology, is an element of a person's conduct.
Moreover, the provision in question was essentially inspired by the concern of the community institutions to prohibit member states from taking collective measures in relation to community nationals. It requires that an examination be made of the particular circumstances of each individual affected by a decision based on the safeguarding of public policy. The provision implies without any doubt that the grounds of such a decision should be subject to review by the national courts which, as is the case here, have the power - or sometimes even the duty - to consult this court on the interpretation of the community law applicable. It is in relation to this point, and only this point, that the competence of the member states in this area is limited by the Directive.
It is necessary to examine, finally, whether, by prohibiting the entry of a community national on the grounds which I have rehearsed, the Government of the United Kingdom has not violated the principle of non-discrimination, in other words, that of equality of treatment with nationals, which is the necessary corollary of freedom of movement for individuals, and which, based principally upon article 7 of the Treaty, is expressly applicable to employed persons by virtue of article 48. It is an established fact that, although the Church of Scientology is, in the eyes of the British Government, socially harmful, and although, in consequence, its activities are considered to be contrary to public policy, they are not unlawful in the United Kingdom and nationals are free to study and practise scientology and also to work at the organisation's establishment. At first sight, there is therefore discrimination in the treatment inflicted on nationals of other states of the community, in the fact that they are refused entry to Britain solely on the ground of their coming to practise scientology at Saint Hill Manor and to take up employment at that establishment.
This discrimination however does not appear to be contrary to the Treaty. The proviso relating to public policy and particularly to public security has the effect of maintaining the competence of the member states in this area, subject to the obligation that measures of public security must be justified by the personal conduct of those concerned. But member states retain, as regards both assessment of the threat to their security and the choice of measures to counteract such a threat, a power the exercise of which does not cast doubt upon the principle of equality of treatment, unless, of course, they misuse this power by exercising it for an improper purpose, such as economic protection.
According to the statements of the British Government, there is no power under past or existing national law to take measures prohibiting the establishment of scientology. That is one consequence of a particularly liberal form of government. It would doubtless be quite different in other member states, the governments of which regard the activities of the said organisation as being contrary to public policy. But, in so far as the United Kingdom Government has the legal means to prevent foreign nationals, and even community nationals, from coming to expand, within the United Kingdom, the band of followers of scientology, it appears that it can act in the way it does without creating discrimination within the meaning of article 48 of the Treaty. The action it has taken lies within the powers which the proviso relating to public policy contained in that article confers upon every member state.
In conclusion, the court is advised to rule:
1. The provisions of article 48 of the Treaty and those of article 3 (1) of the Council Directive 64/221 are directly applicable in the legal order of every member state and confer on individuals concerned rights which the national authorities must protect.
2. The fact that a person has been or is associated with an organisation the activities of which are considered by a member state to be contrary to public policy even though those activities are not, within the territory of that state, prohibited by national law, is a matter which comes within the concept of "personal conduct" and which may justify a measure taken on the ground of public policy or public security within the meaning of the aforementioned provision of Directive 64/221.
3. The fact that a person enters the member state concerned with the intention of taking up employment with an organisation the activities of which are considered to be contrary to public policy and public security, it being the case that no restriction is placed upon nationals of that member state who wish to take up similar employment with that organisation, is likewise a matter falling within the concept of "personal conduct."

December 4, 1974. The following judgment was delivered in open court in Luxembourg.

FACTS

The order for reference and the written observations submitted pursuant to article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the E.E.C. may be summarised as follows:

I. Facts and procedure

1. The Church of Scientology is a body established in the United States of America, which functions in the United Kingdom through a college at East Grinstead, Sussex. The British Government regards the activities of the Church of Scientology as contrary to public policy. On July 25, 1968, the Minister of Health stated in the House of Commons that the government was satisfied that scientology was socially harmful. The statement included the following remarks:

"Scientology is a pseudo-philosophical cult.... The government are satisfied having reviewed all the available evidence that scientology is socially harmful. It alienates members of families from each other and attributes squalid and disgraceful motives to all who oppose it; its authoritarian principles and practice are a potential menace to the personality and well being of those so deluded as to become its followers; above all its methods can be a serious danger to the health of those who submit to them. There is evidence that children are now being indoctrinated. There is no power under existing law to prohibit the practice of scientology; but the government have concluded that it is so objectionable that it would be right to take all steps within their power to curb its growth.... Foreign nationals come here to study scientology and to work at the so-called 'college' in East Grinstead. The government can prevent this under existing law... and have decided to do so. The following steps are being taken with immediate effect... (e) Work permits and employment vouchers will not be issued to foreign nationals... for work at a scientology establishment."

No legal restrictions are placed upon the practice of scientology in the United Kingdom nor upon British nationals (with certain immaterial exceptions) wishing to become members of or take employment with the Church of Scientology.
2. Miss Van Duyn is a Dutch national. By a letter dated May 4, 1973, she was offered employment as a secretary with the Church of Scientology at its college at East Grinstead. With the intention of taking up that offer she arrived at Gatwick Airport on May 9, 1973, where she was interviewed by an immigration officer and refused leave to enter the United Kingdom. It emerged in the course of the interview that she had worked in a scientology establishment in Amsterdam for six months, that she had taken a course in the subject of scientology, that she was a practising scientologist and that she was intending to work at a scientology establishment in the United Kingdom.
The ground of refusal of leave to enter which is stated in the document entitled "Refusal of leave to enter" handed by the immigration officer to Miss Van Duyn reads:

"You have asked for leave to enter the United Kingdom in order to take employment with the Church of Scientology but the Secretary of State considers it undesirable to give anyone leave to enter the United Kingdom on the business of or in the employment of that organisation...."

The power to refuse entry into the United Kingdom is vested in immigration officers by virtue of section 4 (1) of the Immigration Act 1971. Leave to enter was refused by the immigration officer acting in accordance with the policy of the government and with rule 65 of the relevant Immigration Rules for Control of Entry which Rules have legislative force. Rule 65 reads:

"Any passenger except the wife or child under 18 of a person settled in the United Kingdom may be refused leave to enter on the ground that his exclusion is conducive to the public good, where - (a) the Secretary of State has personally so directed, or (b) from information available to the immigration officer it seems right to refuse leave to enter on that ground - if, for example, in the light of the passenger's character, conduct or associations it is undesirable to give him leave to enter."

3. Relying on the community rules on freedom of movement of workers and especially on article 48 of the E.E.C. Treaty, Regulation 1612/68 and article 3 of Directive 64/221, Miss Van Duyn claims that the refusal of leave to enter was unlawful and seeks a declaration from the High Court that she is entitled to stay in the United Kingdom for the purpose of employment and to be given leave to enter the United Kingdom.
Before deciding further, the High Court has stayed the proceedings and requested the Court of Justice, pursuant to article 177 of the E.E.C. Treaty, to give a preliminary ruling on the following questions. 1. Whether article 48 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community is directly applicable so as to confer on individuals rights enforceable by them in the court of a member state. 2. Whether Directive 64/221 adopted on February 25, 1964, in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community is directly applicable so as to confer on individuals rights enforceable by them in the courts of a member state. 3. Whether upon the proper interpretation of Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and article 3 of Directive 64/221/EEC a member state in the performance of its duty to base a measure taken on grounds of public policy exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned is entitled to take into account as matters of personal conduct (a) the fact that the individual is or has been associated with some body or organisation the activities of which the member state considers contrary to the public good but which are not unlawful in that state, (b) the fact that the individual intends to take employment in the member state with such a body or organisation, it being the case that no restrictions are placed upon nationals of the member state who wish to take similar employment with such a body or organisation.
4. The order of the High Court of March 1, 1974, was registered at the court on June 13, 1974. Written observations have been submitted on behalf of Miss Van Duyn by Alan Newman, on behalf of the United Kingdom by W. H. Godwin and on behalf of the Commission by its legal adviser, A. McClellan. Having heard the report of the Judge-Rapporteur and the opinion of the Advocate-General, the court decided to open the oral procedure without any preparatory inquiry.

II. Written observations submitted to the court

On the first question

Miss Van duyn and the Commission submit that article 48 of the E.E.C. Treaty is directly applicable. They rely in particular on the judgments of the court of April 4, 1974, in In re French Merchant Seamen; E.C. Commission v. France (Case 167/73) [1974] E.C.R. 359 and of June 21. 1974, in Reyners v. Belgian State (Case 2/74) [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 305.
In the light of the judgment in In re French Merchant Seamen (Case 167/73), the United Kingdom makes no submission on this question.

On the second question

Miss Van Duyn submits that article 3 of Directive 64/221 is directly applicable. She observes that the court has already held that, in principle directives are susceptible of direct application. She refers to the judgments of the court of October 6, 1970, in Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein (Case 9/70) (1970) XVL Recueil 825 and of December 17, 1970, in S.A.C.E. v. Italian Ministry of Finance (Case 33/70) (1970) XVI Recueil 1213; [1971] C.M.L.R. 123. She submits that the criterion as to whether a directive is directly applicable is identical with the criterion adopted in the case of articles in the Treaty itself, and she observes that the court has not felt itself constrained to hold that a given article in the Treaty is not directly applicable merely because in its formal wording it imposes an obligation on a member state. She refers to the judgments of the court of December 19, 1968, in Salgoil S.p.A. v. Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade (Case 13/68) (1968) XIV Recueil 661 and of June 16, 1966, in Alfons Lütticke G.m.b.H. v. Hauptzollamt Sarrelouis (Case 57/65) (1966) XII Recueil 293. Miss Van Duyn further submits that a directive which directly affects an individual is capable of creating direct rights for that individual where its provisions are clear and unconditional and where, as to the result to be achieved, it leaves no substantial measure of discretion to the member state. Provided that these criteria are fulfilled it does not matter (a) whether the provision in the directive consists of a positive obligation to act or of a negative prohibition, or (b) that the member state has a choice of form and methods to be adopted in order to achieve the stated result. As to (a), it is implicit in the court's judgments in the cases of Lütticke and Salgoil (already cited) that an article of the Treaty which imposes a positive obligation on a member state to act is capable of direct applicability and the same reasoning is valid in relation to directives. As to (b), she notes that article 189 of the Treaty expressly draws a distinction in relation to directives between the binding effect of the result to be achieved and the discretionary nature of the methods to be adopted.
She contends that the provisions of article 3 fulfil the criteria for direct applicability. She refers to the preamble to the Directive which envisages a direct applicability when it states:

"whereas, in each member state, nationals of other member states should have adequate legal remedies available to them in respect of the administration in such matters..."

(i.e. when a member state invokes grounds of public policy, public security or public health in matters connected with the movement or residence of foreign nationals).
The only "adequate legal remedy" available to an individual is the right to invoke the provisions of the Directive before the national courts. A decision to this effect would undoubtedly strengthen the legal protection of individual citizens in the national courts.
The Commission submits that a provision in a directive is directly applicable when it is clear and unambiguous. It refers to the judgments in the Grad and S.A.C.E. cases (already cited).
The Commission observes that a community regulation has the same weight with immediate effect as national legislation whereas the effect of a directive is similar to that of those provisions of the Treaty which create obligations for the member states. If provisions of a directive are legally clear and unambiguous, leaving only a discretion to the national authorities for their implementation, they must have an effect similar to those Treaty provisions which the court has recognised as directly applicable.
It therefore submits that (a) the executive of a member state is bound to respect community law; (b) if a provision in a directive is not covered by an identical provision in national law, but left, as to the result to be achieved, to the discretion of the national authority, the discretionary power of that authority is reduced by the community provision, (c) in these circumstances and given that to comply with a directive it is not always indispensable to amend national legislation it is clear that the private individual must have the right to prevent the national authority concerned from exceeding its powers under community law to the detriment of that individual.
According to the Commission, article 3 is one of the provisions of Directive 64/221 having all the characteristics necessary to have direct effect in the member state to which it is addressed. And it further recalls that the difficulty of applying the rules in a particular case does not derogate from their general application. In this context the Commission examines the judgment of October 7, 1968, of the Belgian Conseil d'Etat in the Corveleyn case (CE 1968, no. 13.146 arrêt 7.10.1968, p. 710).
As the British authorities have not adopted the wording of article 3 of the Directive to achieve the required result, the Commission submits, by virtue of article 189 of the Treaty and in the light of the case law of the court, that article 3 is a directly applicable obligation which limits the wide discretion given to immigration officers under rule 65 in the "Statement of Immigration Rules." The Commission proposes the following answer to the question: where a provision is legally clear and unambiguous as is article 3 of Directive 64/221, such a provision is directly applicable so as to confer on individuals rights enforceable by them in the courts of a member state.
The United Kingdom recalls that article 189 of the E.E.C. Treaty draws a clear distinction between regulations and directives, and that different effects are ascribed to each type of provision. It therefore submits that prima facie the Council in not issuing a regulation must have intended that the Directive should have an effect other than that of a regulation and accordingly should not be binding in its entirety and not be directly applicable in all member states.
The United Kingdom submits that neither the Grad nor the S.A.C.E. decision is authority for the proposition that it is immaterial whether or not a provision is contained in a regulation, directive or decision. In both cases the purpose of the directive in question was merely to fix a date for the implementation of clear and binding obligations contained in the Treaty and instruments made under it. Those cases show that in special circumstances a limited provision in a directive could be directly applicable. The provisions of the Directive in the present case are wholly different. Directive 64/221 is far broader in scope. It gives comprehensive guidance to member states as to all measures taken by them affecting freedom of movement for workers and it was expressly contemplated in article 10 that member states would put into force the measures necessary to comply with the provisions of the Directive. Indeed the very terms of article 3 (1) itself contemplate the taking of measures.
The United Kingdom examines the only four cases in which national courts to its knowledge have considered the question of the direct applicability of the Directive. It submits that little assistance can be obtained from these cases. Inter alia it points out that the true effect of the Corveleyn case (already cited) has been the subject of considerable debate among Belgian jurists and the better view appears to be that the Conseil d'Etat did not decide that the Directive was directly applicable but applied the Belgian concept of public order which itself required international obligations of Belgium to be taken into account.

On the third question

Miss Van Duyn points out that the first part of the question assumes a situation where an organisation engages in activities which are lawful in the state. The question does not necessarily assume that the individual concerned intends to continue this association. It is sufficient that he has in the past been associated. In this respect Miss Van Duyn recalls that even if the individual had been associated with an illegal organisation and, by virtue of his activities therein, had been convicted of a crime, that circumstance would not, by virtue of the provisions of article 3, paragraph 2, of Directive 64/221, in itself be sufficient grounds for the member state to take measures based on public policy to exclude the individual. Merely belonging to a lawful organisation, without necessarily taking part in its activities, cannot, in her submission, amount to "conduct." Conduct implies "activity." Moreover, the activities of the organisation in question are not, merely because the individual is or has been a passive member, "personal" to the individual concerned. To hold otherwise would mean that a member state could exclude an individual merely because, in the distant past, he had for a brief period perfectly lawfully belonged to a somewhat extreme political or religious organisation in his own member state.
In regard to the second part of the question, Miss Van Duyn recalls that freedom of movement of persons is one of the fundamental principles established by the Treaty and that discrimination on grounds of nationality is prohibited in article 7. Exemptions to these fundamental principles must be interpreted restrictively.
She points out that the question assumes discrimination on grounds of nationality and that it assumes a situation where an individual whose past activity has been blameless seeks entry into a member state in order to work for an organisation in whose employment the nationals of the member state are perfectly free to engage. She submits that if an organisation is deemed contrary to the public good the member state is faced with a simple choice: either to ban everyone, including its own nationals, from engaging in employment with that organisation, or to tolerate nationals of other member states as it tolerates its own nationals engaging in such employment.
The Commission asserts that the concepts "public policy" and "personal conduct" contained in article 48, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and article 3 of Directive 64/221 are concepts of community law. They must first be interpreted in the context of community law and national criteria are only relevant to its application.
In practice, if each member state could set limits to the interpretation of public policy the obligations deriving from the principle of freedom of movement of workers would take a variety of forms in different member states. It is only possible for this freedom to be maintained throughout the community on the basis of uniform application in all the member states. It would be inconsistent with the Treaty if one member state accepted workers from another member state while its own workers did not receive uniform treatment as regards the application of the rules in respect of public order in that other state.
The Commission submits that the discrimination by a member state on grounds of public policy against nationals of another member state for being employed by an organisation the activities of which it considers contrary to the public good when it does not make it unlawful for its own nationals to be employed by such organisation is contrary to article 48, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. Article 3 (1) of the Directive is precise in stating that measures taken on grounds of public policy shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned. Personal conduct which is acceptable when exercised by a national of one member state cannot be unacceptable, under community law, when exercised by a national of another member state.
It is for consideration that article 3 precludes a member state, as general contingency against some potential harm to society, from invoking public policy as a ground for refusing entry when the personal conduct of the individual is or was not contrary to public policy in the member states concerned. It is not denied that membership of a militant organisation proscribed in the host member state would be an element to be taken into account in assessing personal conduct for the purpose of justifying a refusal of entry on grounds of public policy or public security.
As to the first part of the question the United Kingdom deals with three problems.
The first problem is whether an individual's past or present association with an organisation can be regarded as an aspect of his personal conduct. The United Kingdom asserts that it is of importance that a member state in relation to public policy should be entitled to consider a person's associations with a body or organisation. The member state should be entitled to exclude that person in appropriate cases, i.e. if the organisation is considered sufficiently undesirable from the viewpoint of public policy and the association by that person with that organisation is sufficiently close.
Secondly the United Kingdom submits that a measure which is taken on grounds of public policy and which provides for the exclusion from a member state of an individual on the ground of that individual's association with an organisation is compatible with the requirement of article 3 (1). It accepts that the intention underlying that article must have been to exclude collective expulsions and to require the consideration by the national authorities of the personal circumstances of each individual in each case. Nevertheless it is not inconsistent with that intention for a member state to take into account an individual's association with an organisation and, in appropriate cases, to exclude the individual by reason of that association. Whether, in any case, such exclusion is justified will depend on the view that the member state takes of the organisation.
As a practical matter the processes of admitting persons to enter a member state must be administered by a large number of officials. Such officials cannot be expected to know all that the government may know about a particular organisation and it is inevitable that such officials must act in accordance with directions given by the government and laying down broad principles on which the officials are to act. It is inevitable also that such directions may relate to particular organisations which a government may consider contrary to the public good.
Thirdly the United Kingdom submits that the fact that the activities of the organisation are not unlawful in a member state though considered by the member state to be contrary to the public good does not disentitle the member state from taking into account the individual's association with the organisation. It must be a matter for each state to decide whether it should make activities of an organisation, or the organisation itself, illegal. Only that state is competent to make such evaluation and it will do so in the light of the particular circumstances of that state. Thus, as is common knowledge, the United Kingdom practises a considerable degree of tolerance in relation to organisations within the United Kingdom. In the case of scientology the reasons why the United Kingdom regards the activities of the scientologists as contrary to public policy were explained in the statement made in Parliament on July 25, 1968. The scientologists still have their world headquarters in the United Kingdom so that scientology is of particular concern to the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom notes that two problems arise in connection with the matter referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of the question.
The first problem is whether the fact that an individual intends to take employment with such an organisation is an aspect of that individual's personal conduct. It is submitted that such an intention is a very material aspect of the individual's personal conduct.
The second problem is whether the fact that no restrictions are placed upon nationals of the member state who wish to take similar employment with such an organisation disentitles the member state from taking this intention into account.
The United Kingdom points out that it is inevitable that in respect of the entry into a state of persons, there must be some discrimination in favour of the nationals of that state. For a national, however undesirable and potentially harmful his entry may be, cannot be refused admission into his own state. A state has a duty under international law to receive back its own nationals. The United Kingdom refers, inter alia, to article 5 (b) (ii) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states: "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." It observes that, for example, a member state would be justified in refusing to admit a drug addict who is a national of another state even though it would be obliged to admit a drug addict who was one of its own nationals.
Miss Van Duyn, represented by Alan Newman, the United Kingdom, represented by Peter Gibson, and the Commission represented by Anthony McClellan, submitted oral observations at the hearing on October 23, 1974.
The Advocate-General delivered his opinion at the hearing on November 13, 1974.

LAW

1. By order of Pennycuick V.-C., of March 1, 1974, lodged at the court on June 13, the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice of England, referred to the court, under article 177 of the E.E.C. Treaty, three questions relating to the interpretation of certain provisions of community law concerning freedom of movement for workers.
2. These questions arise out of an action brought against the Home Office by a woman of Dutch nationality who was refused leave to enter the United Kingdom to take up employment as a secretary with the "Church of Scientology."
3. Leave to enter was refused in accordance with the policy of the Government of the United Kingdom in relation to the said organisation, the activities of which it considers to be socially harmful.

First question

4. By the first question, the court is asked to say whether article 48 of the E.E.C. Treaty is directly applicable so as to confer on individuals rights enforceable by them in the courts of a member state.
5. It is provided, in article 48 (1) and (2), that freedom of movement for workers shall be secured by the end of the transitional period and that such freedom shall entail:

"the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of member states as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment."

6. These provisions impose on member states a precise obligation which does not require the adoption of any further measure on the part either of the community institutions or of the member states and which leaves them, in relation to its implementation, no discretionary power.
7. Paragraph 3, which defines the rights implied by the principle of freedom of movement for workers, subjects them to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. The application of these limitations is, however, subject to judicial control, so that a member state's right to invoke the limitations does not prevent the provisions of article 48, which enshrine the principle of freedom of movement for workers, from conferring on individuals rights which are enforceable by them and which the national courts must protect.
8.The reply to the first question must therefore be in the affirmative.

Second question

9. The second question asks the court to say whether Council Directive 64/221 of February 25, 1964, on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health is directly applicable so as to confer on individuals rights enforceable by them in the courts of a member state.
10. It emerges from the order making the reference that the only provision of the Directive which is relevant is that contained in article 3 (1) which provides:

"Measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned."

11. The United Kingdom observes that, since article 189 of the Treaty distinguishes between the effects ascribed to regulations, directives and decisions, it must therefore be presumed that the Council, in issuing a directive rather than making a regulation, must have intended that the directive should have an effect other than that of a regulation and accordingly that the former should not be directly applicable.
12. If, however, by virtue of the provisions of article 189 regulations are directly applicable and, consequently, may by their very nature have direct effects, it does not follow from this that other categories of acts mentioned in that article can never have similar effects. It would be incompatible with the binding effect attributed to a directive by article 189 to exclude, in principle, the possibility that the obligation which it imposes may be invoked by those concerned. In particular, where the community authorities have, by directive, imposed on member states the obligation to pursue a particular course of conduct, the useful effect of such an act would be weakened if individuals were prevented from relying on it before their national courts and if the latter were prevented from taking it into consideration as an element of community law. Article 177, which empowers national courts to refer to the court questions concerning the validity and interpretation of all acts of the community institutions, without distinction, implies furthermore that these acts may be invoked by individuals in the national courts. It is necessary to examine, in every case, whether the nature, general scheme and wording of the provision in question are capable of having direct effects on the relations between member states and individuals.
13. By providing that measures taken on grounds of public policy shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned, article 3 (1) of Directive 64/221 is intended to limit the discretionary power which national laws generally confer on the authorities responsible for the entry and expulsion of foreign nationals. First, the provision lays down an obligation which is not subject to any exception or condition and which, by its very nature, does not require the intervention of any act on the part either of the institutions of the community or of member states. Secondly, because member states are thereby obliged, in implementing a clause which derogates from one of the fundamental principles of the Treaty in favour of individuals, not to take account of factors extraneous to personal conduct, legal certainty for the persons concerned requires that they should be able to rely on this obligation even though it has been laid down in a legislative act which has no automatic direct effect in its entirety.
14. If the meaning and exact scope of the provision raise questions of interpretation, these questions can be resolved by the courts, taking into account also the procedure under article 177 of the Treaty.
15. Accordingly, in reply to the second question, article 3 (1) of Council Directive 64/221 of February 25, 1964, confers on individuals rights which are enforceable by them in the courts of a member state and which the national courts must protect.

Third question

16. By the third question the court is asked to rule whether article 48 of the Treaty and article 3 of Directive 64/221 must be interpreted as meaning:

"a member state, in the performance of its duty to base a measure taken on grounds of public policy exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned, is entitled to take into account as matters of personal conduct: (a) the fact that the individual is or has been associated with some body or organisation the activities of which the member state considers contrary to the public good but which are not unlawful in that state; (b) the fact that the individual intends to take employment in the member state with such a body or organisation it being the case that no restrictions are placed upon nationals of the member state who wish to take similar employment with such a body or organisation."

17. It is necessary, first, to consider whether association with a body or an organisation can in itself constitute personal conduct within the meaning of article 3 of Directive 64/221. Although a person's past association cannot, in general, justify a decision refusing him the right to move freely within the community, it is nevertheless the case that present association, which reflects participation in the activities of the body or of the organisation as well as identification with its aims and its designs, may be considered a voluntary act of the person concerned and, consequently, as part of his personal conduct within the meaning of the provision cited.
18. This third question further raises the problem of what importance must be attributed to the fact that the activities of the organisation in question, which are considered by the member state as contrary to the public good, are not however prohibited by national law. It should be emphasised that the concept of public policy in the context of the community and where, in particular, it is used as a justification for derogating from the fundamental principle of freedom of movement for workers, must be interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each member state without being subject to control by the institutions of the community. Nevertheless, the particular circumstances justifying recourse to the concept of public policy may vary from one country to another and from one period to another, and it is therefore necessary in this matter to allow the competent national authorities an area of discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty.
19. It follows from the above that where the competent authorities of a member state have clearly defined their standpoint as regards the activities of a particular organisation and where, considering it to be socially harmful, they have taken administrative measures to counteract these activities, the member state cannot be required, before it can rely on the concept of public policy, to make such activities unlawful, if recourse to such a measure is not thought appropriate in the circumstances.
20. The question raises finally the problem whether a member state is entitled, on grounds of public policy, to prevent a national of another member state from taking gainful employment within its territory with a body or organisation, it being the case that no similar restriction is placed upon its own nationals.
21. In this connection, the Treaty, while enshrining the principle of freedom of movement for workers without any discrimination on grounds of nationality, admits, in article 48 (3), limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health to the rights deriving from this principle. Under the terms of the provision cited above, the right to accept offers of employment actually made, the right to move freely within the territory of member states for this purpose, and the right to stay in a member state for the purpose of employment are, among others all subject to such limitations. Consequently, the effect of such limitations, when they apply, is that leave to enter the territory of a member state and the right to reside there may be refused to a national of another member state.
22. Furthermore, it is a principle of international law, which the E.E.C. Treaty cannot be assumed to disregard in the relations between member states, that a state is precluded from refusing its own nationals the right of entry or residence.
23. It follows that a member state, for reasons of public policy, can, where it deems necessary, refuse a national of another member state the benefit of the principle of freedom of movement for workers in a case where such a national proposes to take up a particular offer of employment even though the member state does not place a similar restriction upon its own nationals.
24. Accordingly, the reply to the third question must be that article 48 of the E.E.C. Treaty and article 3 (1) of Directive 64/221 are to be interpreted as meaning that a member state, in imposing restrictions justified on grounds of public policy, is entitled to take into account, as a matter of personal conduct of the individual concerned, the fact that the individual is associated with some body or organisation the activities of which the member state considers socially harmful but which are not unlawful in that state, despite the fact that no restriction is placed upon nationals of the said member state who wish to take similar employment with these same bodies or organisations.

Costs

25. The costs incurred by the United Kingdom and by the Commission of the European Communities, which have submitted observations to the court, are not recoverable, and as these proceedings are, in so far as the parties to the main action are concerned, a step in the action pending before the national court, costs are a matter for that court.
On those grounds, the court in answer to the questions referred to it by the High Court of Justice, by order of that court, dated March 1, 1974, hereby rules:
(1) Article 48 of the E.E.C. Treaty has a direct effect in the legal orders of the member states and confers on individuals rights which the national courts must protect.
(2) Article 3 (1) of Council Directive No. 64/221 of February 25, 1964, on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health confers on individuals rights which are enforceable by them in the national courts of a member state and which the national courts must protect.
(3) Article 48 of the Article 48 of the E.E.C. Treaty and article 3 (1) of Directive 64/221 must be interpreted as meaning that a member state, in imposing restrictions justified on grounds of public policy, is entitled to take into account as a matter of personal conduct of the individual concerned, the fact that the individual is associated with some body or organisation the activities of which the member state considers socially harmful but which are not unlawful in that state, despite the fact that no restriction is placed upon nationals of the said member state who wish to take similar employment with the same body or organisation.